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ABSTRACT: We investigate wage effects of deviations from peer group body mass index 
(BMI) to evaluate the influence of social norms on wages. Our approach allows to show 
the existence of the influence of the social norm and to disentangle it from any 
(anticipated) productivity effects associated with deviations from a clinically 
recommended BMI in certain sections of the weight distribution. Estimates of 
between-effects models for 9 European countries for the years 1998 to 2001 suggest 
that the influence of the social norm varies considerably between countries, and wage 
penalties are rather found for upward deviations from the norm and for men. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite the manifold casual evidence that social norms influence labor market 
institutions and social exchange, empirical analyses of the effects of social norms have 
been rare. However, there have been various attempts to include social norms (or related 
concepts like social customs and conformity) in economic models, see e. g. Akerlof (1980), 
Bernheim (1994), Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999), Sliwka (2007) and Akerlof (2008). 
A preliminary for empirical investigations on the role of social norms is the agreement on 
a definition for the social norm. According to Hart (1961, p. 9), a social rule exists when "a 
group of people, or most of them, behave 'as a rule', i. e. generally, in a specified similar 
way in certain kinds of circumstances." Hart (1961, p.10) further states that the crucial 
difference between a social rule and mere convergent routine behavior in a social group 
is "the fact that deviations from certain types of behaviour will probably meet with hostile 
reaction." This notion is adopted in the more recent economic literature. Fehr and 
Gächter (2000, p. 166) define a social norm as "a behavioral regularity; that is ... based on 
a socially shared belief of how one ought to behave; which triggers ... the enforcement of 
the prescribed behavior by informal social sanctions." Of course, social norms regarding 
body mass differ with respect to gender, place and time, as do beauty ideals. The men of 
the Bodi tribe in south Ethiopia compete in who has the biggest belly to decide which of 
them becomes new king, while young women in parts of Mali and Mauretania get 
forcefed gallons of camel milk to put on weight to increase their chances on the marriage 
market. According to the latest estimations of the WHO (2014) in some island states in 
the South Sea like Nauru, American Samoa, Tokelau or Tonga, about 55 up to 78 percent 
of the population are obese.The ideal beauty of the human body does not only vary on a 
geographical dimension but also in a historical dimension which is apparent when 
studying the history of art. For example, Cichon-Hollander (1999) states that “Ideal 
beauty is corresponding with the aesthetic feeling of people of a respecting period.” This 
is obvious when considering the stark contrast between Boticelli’s painting “Birth of 
Venus” dating back to the 15th century to the slim “curveless” body ideal for women in 
the paintings and drawings of the Expressionism (e.g. by Egon Schiele or Max Beckmann) 
in the 20s of the last century. 
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Empirically, the basic problem is to infer the prevalent social norm from empirical 
observations. Empirical approaches in the economic literature to measure the influence 
of social norms considered the relevance of social norms for the behavior of the 
unemployed (see e. g. Moffitt (1983), Clark (2003) or Stutzer and Lalive (2004)), 
pro-environmental behaviour like littering (see Torgler, Frey and Wilson (2009)), sexual 
activity (see Castronova (2004)), criminal behavior (see e. g. Case and Katz (1991) and 
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996)), ideal body weight (see Etilé (2007)) and 
teenage behavior (see e. g. Kooreman (2007)). Blanchflower, van Landeghem and Oswald 
(2009) show that the body mass index (BMI) relative to their peers’ can influence a 
person's well-being and that even imitative obesity can emerge.1  
Even if it were possible to infer the prevalent social norm from empirical observations, it 
is difficult to link this behavior with economic consequences. If social norms prevail in 
employment relations, one possible sanction for deviating behavior could be lower wages 
compared to workers behaving according to the implicit norm. This is possible if wages do 
not reflect solely the productivity of the worker, but also the preferences of the employer 
which are present during wage setting in a Becker (1971) type discrimination model. 
In the present paper, we suggest norms governing body mass, measured by a person's 
body mass index (BMI), as an avenue to identify and study wage effects of social norms. 
This is possible because we argue that peers' BMI constitute a social norm in a sense that 
deviations from the peer group median BMI imply sanctions such as lower market wages. 
The BMI is calculated by dividing a person's weight in kilograms by its squared height in 
meters.2  
                                                     
1
 There are also studies from experimental economics on the effects of social norms. The reason is that it is 
easier in laboratory settings than in field settings to induce a social norm and study its effects on economic 
outcomes (see e. g. Fehr and Gächter (2000), Falk and Fischbacher (2002), and Falk and Ichino (2006)). 
However, the study of wage effects in the experimental laboratory requires strong assumptions on the 
external validity of the experiments. Therefore, these studies appear to be less relevant in this context. 
2
 We are aware of the limitations of BMI as measure for body shape, because it does not account for the 
distribution of an individual’s fat- and muscle mass. Alternate measures like percent of body fat, proposed 
by e. g Burkhauser and Cawley, (2008) should be used when adequate data is available. For instance in their 
recent work, Johansson, Böckerman, Kiiskinen and Heliövaara (2009) analyzed the impact of obesity on 
success in the Finish labor market using fat mass and waist circumference in addition to BMI as measures of 
obesity and Wada and Tekin (2010) showed how body fat and fat-free mass influence wages in the US. 
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Our empirical strategy allows us to show that a social norm effect, defined by deviations 
from peers’ BMI, influences wages in addition to a productivity effect, defined by 
deviations from a clinically optimal BMI.  
 
Productivity effect 
The optimal BMI from a clinical perspective is defined as a BMI with the lowest risk of any 
future weight-related diseases (diabetes, heart attacks etc.). Finding a wage penalty for 
deviations from the optimal weight-to-height measure in estimates while controlling for 
current health status can be interpreted as a lower future productivity reflected in 
current wages. Employers might sanction anticipated future health risks associated with 
an unhealthy body shape with lower wages to smooth the life-time payroll. This effect is 
enforced by rigid labor market institutions which make it costly to dismiss an 
unproductive worker in the future. Lower wages might also reflect a lower productivity of 
the worker due to lower investments in human capital, because a shorter work life due to 
future health risks is anticipated by the employee and the employer. Note however, that 
a lower wage associated with deviations from an optimal BMI might also reflect sanctions 
for deviations from a norm as constituted by the optimal BMI from a clinical point of 
view. 
 
Social norm effect 
Weight is perceived as volitional (see Goode (2008) or Saporta and Halpern (2002)) and is 
therefore also governed by social norms regarding a "normal" BMI. While a part of the 
human physical appearance is genetic, a considerable part is accounted to individual 
behavior and is therefore potentially under the rule of a social norm according to the 
definition in Fehr and Gächter (2000). For instance, according to Goode (2008, p. 337) 
sociologists consider the study of obesity as particularly interesting, "because it is 
considered by the thin or averaged-sized majority as both physical characteristic, like 
blindness or paraplegia, and a form of behavioral deviance, like prostitution or 
alcoholism. The obese, unlike the physically disabled, are held responsible for their 
condition." This is supported by evidence of DeJong (1980) that adolescent girls evaluate 
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an obese peer less positively unless she "could offer an 'excuse' for weight, such as a 
glandular disorder." We consider it as evidence for the existence of a social norm 
governing body mass if we do find wage discrimination for a deviation from the group 
norm on body mass.3 The norm is defined by the gender, age group, and region specific 
median BMI. Lower wages associated with deviations from the group norm reflect 
employers' preferences to deal with workers with a norm-compatible body shape. 
 
The volitional character of body mass is probably the reason why discrimination on the 
basis of body mass is typically not on the agenda when discussing labor market 
discrimination. The disregard of discrimination by body stature is astonishing in the light 
of existing evidence. Roehling (1999, p. 982) concludes, after an interdisciplinary review 
of empirical research on weight-based discrimination in employment, that "evidence of 
discrimination is found at virtually every stage of the employment cycle." Furthermore, 
data of a Swedish field experiment conducted by Rooth (2009) shows that discrimination 
of obese applicants is the same against men and women, but that there is a systematic 
variation across occupations. There is some evidence that the more customer contact an 
occupation includes, the more discrimination against obese applicants takes place. 
However, findings on the relationship between obesity and employment are mixed. While 
Morris (2007) shows a negative effect on employment for men and women in England, 
the effect for women is underestimated if not controled for the endogeneity of obesity. 
Lindeboom, Lundborg and van der Klaauw (2010) show for Britan that the negative 
influence of obesity on employment becomes insignificant when controlling for 
endogeneity of obesity for both sexes. For Germany, Caliendo and Lee (2013) show that 
obese women are disadvantaged in finding a job compared to women of normal weight, 
while there is no such effect for obese men. 
Our approach is inspired by Harper (2000). He finds that relative weight measures in the 
form of indicator variables, which represent the location of the respondent in the gender 
distribution of body mass for a given age, are more relevant than absolute measures of 
obesity. A similar approach is followed in Saporta and Halpern (2002) who use relative 
                                                     
3
 This approach follows the reactive definition of deviant behavior in sociology. According to the reactive 
definition, deviant behavior (and therefore the respective reference norm) exists, if negative consequences 
of deviant behavior are observed (Goode, 2008). 
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weight measures to control for a potentially different distribution in body mass in a 
sample of lawyers. While these studies emphasize the importance of identifying the 
influence of weight differences from a norm, there have so far not been any attempts to 
disentangle these norm effects from productivity effects. 
The present paper aims to take a conservative approach on the influence of body mass on 
wages avoiding several shortcomings in existing studies. We take account of direct health 
problems related to body shape by controlling for subjective health assessments. Since 
body mass increases naturally with age, the sample is restricted to workers between 19 
and 44 of age to avoid a structural break in the body mass-wage relation. By including 
dummy variables for deviations in the lower and upper direction of a reference body 
mass, we allow for a non-linear relation between body mass and wage. Beside the studies 
by García and Quintana-Domeque (2007) and Atella, Pace and Vuri (2008), this is the only 
study providing multi-country evidence on the weight-wage relation with separate 
estimates for each country. The latter is, however, indispensable as different labor market 
institutions prevail in the different European countries. 
The study of wage effects of physical appearance attracted the interest of economic 
research in the nineties with the seminal work by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) and 
Averett and Korenman (1996). Recently, the availability of longitudinal data providing 
information on weight and wages has stimulated the application of different econometric 
approaches to come closer to a causal relation between weight and wages. The more 
recent literature has been particularly inspired by Cawley (2000), (2004) and Behrman 
and Rosenzweig (2001). 
Also the availability of standardized longitudinal European data including information on 
various socio-economic characteristics caused a recent interest on the weight-wage 
relation in Europe, in particular in a cross-country context. Sousa (2005) and Brunello and 
D'Hombres (2007) apply a propensity score and an instrumental variable approach, 
respectively, to identify a causal relation between body weight and wages. However, 
these studies only exploit the informational content of a cross-country comparison to a 
limited extent. None of these papers attempted to disentangle productivity effects from 
social norm effects in the relation between body mass and wages. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the approach to identify an 
influence of the social norm concerning body mass on wages. Features of the data and 
the sample used in this paper are reported in section 3. Section 4 describes and discusses 
the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Empirical Approach 
We first discuss implications from different approaches to identify a causal relation of 
body mass on wages for the present paper. After that we describe our empirical strategy 
to show the existence of penalties for deviations from peers' BMI (social norm effects) 
and how we can disentangle them for some part of the weight distribution from penalties 
for deviations from medically optimal BMI (productivety effect). 
 
The causal effect of body mass on wages 
According to Cawley (2004), there are three reasons that might explain a negative 
correlation between body mass and wages, which have been found in several empirical 
studies. First, the effect of body mass on wages might reflect a lower productivity through 
body size or discrimination. Second, this correlation could also identify an effect of wages 
on body size, for instance, via changes in the behavior of food intake or the quality of the 
consumed food. Third, unobservable individual effects might be correlated with both 
weight and wages. Several econometric approaches are applied in the literature to 
explain which of the suggested explanations for the correlation between weight and 
wages should be followed.  
Estimates using lagged values of body mass in wage equations remove any 
contemporaneous effects, if lagged body mass is independent of the residual in the 
current wage equation. The independence assumption would be violated, for instance, if 
overweight during some course in life is the result of a genetic predisposition towards 
overweight which might also be correlated with workplace productivity. See Cawley 
(2004) for a more formal development of this argument. A second approach controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity by taking differences with a sibling, with a close family 
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member or alternatively by fixed effects estimates. The underlying assumption for the 
latter is that unobserved individual heterogeneity remains constant over time. Given the 
comparatively short time span of the data used in the present paper (4 years), this 
assumption might not be too hazardous. However, the data are in this case not very 
informative about the within-individual variation. Moreover, if most of the true variation 
in body mass is cross-sectional and body mass (and in particular the individual variation in 
body mass over time) is measured with error, coefficients are biased toward zero and 
standard errors are high (Hamermesh, 2000). Brunello and D'Hombres (2007) report 
according evidence that this might be the case when using ECHP data. 
The instrumental variable (IV) approach also comes along with major shortcomings. 
Cawley (2004) uses a sibling's body mass when controlling for age and gender as an 
instrument. The validity of the approach hinges on the non-testable assumption that a 
sibling's BMI is uncorrelated with the error term in the wage regression of the individual. 
In particular, as long as the precise transmission mechanism is unclear, it is equally likely 
that the same genetic or non-genetic characteristic, which leads to the siblings' BMI being 
correlated, also leads to other factors affecting labor market outcomes being correlated. 
The latter reflects a violation of the order condition and proves the instrument to be 
invalid. Additional practical limitations of the approach are given by the fact that 
instruments based on family relations lead to a considerable reduction of sample sizes. 
Brunello and D'Hombres (2007) try to circumvent the data limitations in the ECHP by 
taking the average BMI of parents and siblings. While still reducing the sample size 
considerably (by excluding households without parents or siblings currently alive), the 
informational content of the instrument varies from individual to individual. A new 
possiblility to deal with this problems seems to be the use of genetic information. Norton 
and Han (2008) and Ding, Lehrer, Rosenquist and Audrain McGovern (2009) show first 
promising results regarding the explanation of obesity, even if they still face the problem 
that some of the genetic markers which influence weight may also be influencing 
characteristics related to labour market outcomes. Additionaly, datasets which include 
genetic information have small observation numbers and are rarely available. It is due to 
the methodological problems associated with the IV approach and the data limitations 
that we follow García and Quintana-Domeque (2007) and Sousa (2005) and refrain from 
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following the IV approach in order to investigate the relation between body mass and 
wages with ECHP data. Sousa (2005) applies a propensity score approach instead, which 
relies on strong distributional assumptions and on the choice of the covariates included in 
the propensity score model. 
Given the comparatively short time span of the ECHP data providing information on body 
mass and the limitations in sample sizes as well as the strong assumptions associated with 
the instrumental variable and propensity score approaches, we think that the relation 
between BMI and wages is best identified with cross-sectional variation. We will 
therefore report results for estimates of between effects models. For comparison, we 
provide results of the estimation of a fixed effects model in the appendix. However, we 
will be careful when interpreting any significant correlation as causal relation between 
weight and wages. 
 
Peers' body mass and the concept of an optimal BMI 
Our central approach includes dummies for deviations from the social norm BMI as well 
as for deviations from the optimal BMI in a clinical sense in a wage regression. Finding a 
significant effect for the influence of a deviation from the social norm governing BMI 
while controlling for the clinical dummies, would indicate an influence of the social norm. 
We take the gender and broad age group specific median BMI for each broad region 
within a country and observation year as the prevalent social norm for the weight-height 
relation for the individual. This approach is related to the approach formulated in Alessie 
and Kapteyn (1991). According to this approach, a set of people who share certain 
characteristics form a social group and the social group to which an individual belongs to, 
could serve as a proxy for his or her reference group. 
Deviations from a social norm are represented in our preferred specification in Equation 
(1) by two dummy variables for a deviation from peers' body mass credited to the fact 
that a body mass index above the social norm might have different wage effects than a 
body mass below the social norm. 
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In particular, we identify with norm1  a BMI which is more than three index points below 
peers' BMI and with norm2  a BMI which is more than three index points above peers' 
BMI. To make our identification strategy valid, it is necessary to use a fixed value for the 
deviation. The definition of the relevant deviation from the respective body mass 
reference value by three index points is owed to the fact that three index points are 
approximately the average standard deviation from the mean body mass within countries 
as displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1 lists the mean, minimum and maximum of the within country body mass norms 
which are calculated by gender, age group4, and region specific median BMI. The number 
of different cells mainly reflects the level of regional disaggregation for the respective 
country. It gets down to 12 different cells for men and women in Denmark, where no 
regional information is available, representing median values for the 3 different age 
groups in the 4-year-sample for men and women, respectively. Owing to the small 
number of definable social groups in Denmark, we will be particularly cautious when 
evaluating the results for this country.  
We observe a huge variation in the social norm body mass when inspecting the minimum 
and maximum values of the social norm body mass within countries. In addition the 
country-specific mean of norm BMI varies between countries, the differences are 
however moderate. The mean of the standard deviation, where the standard deviation 
refers to the mean of the standard deviation of the body mass per observation cell, is 
higher for women than for men and differs considerably between countries. 
  
                                                     
4
 The three broad age groups are 19 to 24, 25 to 34 and 35 to 44. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for gender and broad age group specific median of the BMI for each region 
and observation year 
 
Men 
 Mean Min Max 
Mean of 
Standard 
Deviation 
No. of 
different 
cells 
Austria 24.50 22.46 25.79 3.14 34 
Belgium 24.17 20.98 25.00 3.50 33 
Denmark 24.56 22.86 25.18 3.49 12 
Finland 24.69 21.94 26.04 3.39 54 
Greece 25.31 23.06 26.30 2.94 31 
Ireland 25.20 21.33 26.88 3.10 18 
Italy 24.25 21.33 26.09 3.09 105 
Portugal 24.83 22.53 26.40 2.94 72 
Spain 25.08 21.97 27.58 3.48 78 
 
Women 
 Mean Min Max 
Mean of 
Standard 
Deviation 
No. of 
different 
cells 
Austria 22.18 20.57 23.15 3.56 30 
Belgium 22.03 19.61 23.42 3.86 35 
Denmark 22.82 21.97 23.31 3.96 12 
Finland 23.11 20.70 24.43 3.98 54 
Greece 22.78 20.20 25.83 3.62 40 
Ireland 23.14 21.20 24.56 3.65 22 
Italy 21.68 19.63 23.88 3.25 100 
Portugal 23.29 20.94 26.56 3.64 74 
Spain 22.06 19.66 24.24 3.45 76 
ECHP data, years 1998-2001. For details on the selected sample see text. The 
information is displayed for the sample as used in the regressions (observa-
tion numbers see Table 2). The unit of observation is the peer group. The 
standard deviation refers to the standard deviation of the mean BMI within a 
peer group. 
 
Deviations from medical recommended BMI are modeled analogically. medic1  and 
medic
2  
describe deviations of more than three index points from an clinically optimal BMI of 23. 
Negative values for medic1  identify expected negative productivity effects stemming from 
expected future health limitations of a lower than the optimal body mass while 
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controlling for current health status. Further, medic2  identifies the productivity effect of a 
higher than optimal body mass.  
In medical scholarly journals there has been some discussion on the optimal BMI value 
from a health perspective. According to Calle, Thun, Petrelli, Rodriguez and Heath (1999), 
the age standardized mortality rate controlled for smoking behavior and any history of 
disease for white men and women was lowest for a BMI in the range 22.0 – 24.9. Willett, 
Dietz and Colditz (1999) report empirical evidence that the risk of different diseases like 
hypertension and coronary heart disease begins to increase at BMIs > 22 – 23. In a 
meta-analysis including 97 studies, Flegal, Kit, Orpana and Graubard (2013) show that 
hazard ratios of all-cause mortality is lowest for people with BMIs between 25 and 30. 
Wannamethee, Shaper, Walker and Ebrahim (1998) found for a sample of British men 
that the 15-year survival, free of heart attack, stroke, and diabetes, is highest for those 
with a BMI between 22.0 and 23.9. This is in line with the recommendation of a median 
BMI in the range 21 - 23 as the target value for an optimum balancing of the hazards 
associated with both underweight and overweight WHO (2000). We therefore take an 
BMI of 23 as optimal.5 
In the following, we report the weight associated with the average height of men and 
women in Europe to give an impression about the weight and the weight deviations 
associated with an optimal BMI of 23 and the deviation of three BMI points. BMI of 20, 23 
and 26 for a given height of 1.80 meters are associated with a body weight of 64.80 kg, 
74.52 kg, and 84.24 kg, respectively; the corresponding BMI for a given height of 1.65 
meters are associated with a body weight of 54.54 kg, 62.62 kg, and 70.79 kg, 
respectively. 
 
  
                                                     
5
 As we consider a sample of men and women in the age range between 19 and 44 for our study, we do not 
need to take higher BMI due to increasing age into account. One should be aware that the validity of the 
BMI to measure obesity and predict the associated risk of cardiovascular events and total mortality is chal-
lenged by recent evidence (Romero-Corral, Montori, Somer, Korinek, Thomas, Allison, Mookadam and 
Lopez-Jimenez, 2006). Still, the identification of underweight and other weight-related diseases by means of 
body mass information is not taken into question. Besides, our approach relies on a body fat measure re-
lated to physical appearance to be observable by peers and employers. 
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Figure 1: Example of the identification strategy using the example of an upward deviation of Spanish men 
 
 
 
Figure 1 displays our identification strategy using the example of Spanish men in a BMI 
range above the medically recommended or social norm BMI, so we are looking at an 
upward deviation. Here, one can see that disentangling productivity effects from norm 
effects with estimations of Equation (1) is only possible in the shaded area, i.e. in a range 
where values for medically optimal BMI and norm BMI differ. In the example regarding 
Spanish men, this is the case for a BMI between 24.97, the upper bound of the minimal 
median peer group BMI, and 30.58, the upper bound of the maximum median peer group 
BMI. Now, we can identify a norm effect, if the BMI is above 24.97 but below 26 (the 
upper bound of the medically optimal BMI), and we can identify a productivity effect, if 
the actual BMI ist above 26 but below 30.58. Because the social norm BMI is defined 
relative to the peer group, the identification of a productivity or social norm effect for a 
given BMI depends on the median peer BMI in the respective peer group. While those 
with a BMI well above both the optimal and social norm BMI might also face wage 
penalties or premia, we will not be able to identify these effects with our empirical 
strategy. 
Bearing this and the ceteris paribus assumption in mind, we consider a social norm effect 
as identified if we find a significant effect for deviation from peer group median BMI 
when estimating Equations (1). Analogously, a productivity effect is identified in the case 
Value of 
indicator 
variable 
NormHeavier 
 
+3 
17   18   19  20   21   22   23   24   25  2 6  27  28   29   30   31   32 
BMI 
medically 
optimal 
BMI 
Value of 
indicator 
variable 
MedHeavier 
1 0 
21,97 
min. 
median 
peer BMI 
27,58 
max. 
median 
peer BMI 
0 or 1 1 0 
+3 
+3 
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that a significant effect for deviation from medical optimal BMI is observable in the 
estimation of Equations (1). As mentioned above, we are aware that our approach is not 
capable of identifying or disentangling wage effects for people with very high or very low 
BMIs. In principal, this might provide a potential bias in our findings. But for three reasons 
this does not derogate our findings much. First, it is our aim to show that an influence of 
social norms on wages exists alongside the productivity effect. Second, this only concerns 
a very small amount of the observations in our sample. Third, and even more important, 
these effects would even augment our findings based on estimates of Equation (1). 
Therefore, our findings only mark the lower limit of the real productivity and social norm 
effects. 
 
3 DATA AND SAMPLE 
The data source for this study is the anonymized user database (UDB) of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) which provides standardized data for most of the 
European countries (see Peracchi (2002)). This data set has also been used by Brunello 
and D'Hombres (2007), Sousa (2005) and García and Quintana-Domeque (2007) in studies 
on the relation between overweight and earnings in Europe. 
Of particular interest for the purpose of the present study is the fact that the ECHP has a 
longitudinal panel design and the information on weight and height of individuals is 
available for the countries Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Austria and Finland for the years 1998 to 2001. For this reason, we restrict our analysis to 
this time span. 
We calculate the body mass index using information on self-reported height and weight. 
This embodies the problem that this information is measured with error. The standard 
result for coefficients of explanatory variables which are measured with error is that the 
coefficients will be biased towards zero. We try to minimize this error by dropping 
observations from individuals for whom self-reported height changes by more than 2 
centimeters from one year to another. The procedure suggested by Cawley (2004) to 
correct for the measurement error is not applicable, due to the lack of other data 
providing information on body mass for European countries. However, Cawley (2000) 
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reports that his findings do not change whether he corrects for self-reported BMI in his 
data or not. A particular problem in the presence of norms regarding body mass is the 
possibility of a systematic misreporting of weight and height to pretend to have a physical 
stature closer to the norm. However, in this case any impact of deviations from the social 
norm regarding body mass on wages would represent a lower bound of the true effect. 
The dependent variable in the wage regressions is the natural logarithm of hourly wages, 
where wages are deflated by consumer price index information. The set of explanatory 
variables includes beside the indicator variables for deviations from optimal or peers' 
BMI: age, square of age, indicators for highest level of general or higher education 
completed, an indicator for marital status6, tenure, indicators for part-time job and 
permanent contract, number of days due to illness in the last four weeks before the 
interview, an indicator for subjective assessment on being hampered in daily work by any 
physical or mental illness or disability, and nine indicators for occupational groups and 
regional controls. The degree of regional information varies from country to country and 
is not available for Denmark. For women, an indicator for the presence of children in the 
household is also included to account for past pregnancies. A list of all variables used in 
the analysis is reported in Table A1 in the appendix. 
We account for the fact that weight tends to rise with age in two ways. First, we restrict 
our sample to workers between 19 and 44 to ensure that individuals are at their adult 
height and to restrict age-related weight increase, like that for women around the years 
of the menopause.7 Second, we include linear and quadratic measures of age as 
explanatory variables in the wage regression. 
As common in the literature, we investigate the labor outcomes of men and women 
separately. Because the European countries are characterized by very different 
institutions governing wage setting and because the influence of the social norm on the 
weight-height relation might differ between European countries, we estimate all 
regressions separately for the countries in the data set. The wage information for the 
self-employed is not available in a manner comparable to the employed workers. Our 
                                                     
6
 There are also some recent studies e. g. Chiappori, Oreffice and Quintana Domeque (2012) and Brown 
(2011), which focus on the interdependencies of marriage, wages and weight. 
7
 For information on the interaction between weight and wage for older workers in Europe see Lunhdborg, 
Bolin, Höjgård and Lindgren (2007). 
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analysis will therefore be restricted to those not working in self-employment. Wage 
regressions are conducted for men and women working more than 15 hours a week. 
 
4 RESULTS 
Table 2 lists the average logarithmic hourly wages for those within the range of the 
clinically optimal BMI and the BMI of their peer group, respectively, as well as the average 
for those being more than three index points below or above the respective reference 
value for each country for men and women. For men, we observe that workers in the 
range of a healthy BMI earn higher wages than unhealthily thin or overweight workers in 
five out of nine countries, while having a BMI in the range of the social norm is rewarded 
with higher wages in six out of nine countries. However, differences in logarithmic wages 
are small.  
Similar to men, having a clinically recommended body mass leads to higher wages for 
female workers in six out of nine countries. This is different for the wages of women in 
the range of the social norm BMI compared to the wages of deviators in body mass. Here, 
higher wages are found in only two out of nine countries. At this stage, we can neither say 
whether wage differences are significant, nor are we able to disentangle any productivity 
effects from effects of the social norm. The numbers in italics give the percentage of 
workers observed in the respective groups. The group with a body mass below the 
clinically recommended range is very small for men. In all countries as well as for both 
sexes there are considerable fractions in the range of the social norm body mass and 
above. However, the distribution between countries differs considerably. 
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Table 2: Average logarithmic hourly wages for those deviating from optimal BMI or peer group BMI. 
 
Men 
 
Deviations from optimal BMI Deviations from social norm BMI 
Obser- 
vations BMI < 20 
20 ≤ BMI 
≤ 26 
BMI > 26 
BMI < 
Norm-BMI 
– 3 
Norm-BMI – 3 
≤ BMI ≤ 
Norm-BMI + 3 
BMI > 
Norm-BMI 
+ 3 
Austria 
4.78 
(2.3 %) 
4.90 
(56.9 %) 
4.88 
(40.8 %) 
4.95 
(8.5 %) 
4.90 
(63.4 %) 
4.83 
(28.1 %) 
3823 
Belgium 
5.93 
(4.4 %) 
6.11 
(49.6 %) 
6.05 
(46.0 %) 
6.08 
(10.9 %) 
6.12 
(51.6 %) 
6.02 
(37.5 %) 
1532 
Denmark 
4.68 
(2.4 %) 
4.83 
(52.4 %) 
4.80 
(45.2 %) 
4.79 
(11.0%) 
4.84 
(56.6 %) 
4.77 
(32.4 %) 
2576 
Finland 
3.94 
(2.6 %) 
4.12 
(57.7 %) 
4.11 
(39.7 %) 
4.08 
(10.9 %) 
4.13 
(63.5 %) 
4.08 
(25.6 %) 
3302 
Greece 
6.82 
(0.9 %) 
7.24 
(31.8 %) 
7.25 
(67.3 %) 
7.24 
(5.6 %) 
7.29 
(42.2 %) 
7.21 
(52.2 %) 
3567 
Ireland 
1.63 
(1.8 %) 
1.97 
(26.6 %) 
1.97 
(71.6 %) 
1.94 
(6.1 %) 
2.03 
(35.2 %) 
1.93 
(58.7 %) 
2511 
Italy 
2.51 
(2.9 %) 
2.64 
(64.5 %) 
2.65 
(32.6 %) 
2.60 
(7.3 %) 
2.65 
(71.0 %) 
2.62 
(21.7 %) 
6583 
Portugal 
6.27 
(2.1 %) 
6.36 
(50.2 %) 
6.40 
(47.7 %) 
6.39 
(9.2 %) 
6.39 
(58.9 %) 
6.36 
(31.9 %) 
6038 
Spain 
6.78 
(1.2 %) 
6.92 
(26.5 %) 
6.82 
(72.3 %) 
6.96 
(5.5 %) 
6.94 
(32.1 %) 
6.79 
(62.4 %) 
7058 
 
 
Women 
 
Deviations from optimal BMI Deviations from social norm BMI 
Obser- 
vations BMI < 20 
20 ≤ BMI 
≤ 26 
BMI > 26 
BMI < 
Norm-BMI 
– 3 
Norm-BMI – 3 
≤ BMI ≤ 
Norm-BMI + 3 
BMI > 
Norm-BMI 
+ 3 
Austria 
4.70 
(17.8 %) 
4.70 
(56.7 %) 
4.72 
(25.5 %) 
4.77 
(8.5 %) 
4.70 
(62.3 %) 
4.71 
(29.2 %) 
2531 
Belgium 
5.99 
(18.0 %) 
6.04 
(57.5 %) 
5.96 
(24.5 %) 
5.99 
(8.2 %) 
6.04 
(63.2 %) 
5.96 
(28.6 %) 
1386 
Denmark 
4.73 
(11.3 %) 
4.72 
(55.6 %) 
4.67 
(33.1 %) 
4.76 
(10.4 %) 
4.72 
(55.1 %) 
4.67 
(34.5 %) 
2250 
Finland 
3.93 
(12.4 %) 
4.01 
(60.0 %) 
3.95 
(27.6 %) 
4.01 
(12.5 %) 
4.00 
(60.5 %) 
3.94 
(27.0 %) 
2873 
Greece 
7.16 
(9.9 %) 
7.24 
(39.6 %) 
7.19 
(50.5 %) 
7.24 
(8.1 %) 
7.22 
(41.8 %) 
7.18 
(50.1 %) 
2516 
Ireland 
1.81 
(6.1 %) 
1.92 
(33.1 %) 
1.84 
(60.8 %) 
1.94 
(6.4 %) 
1.90 
(33.3 %) 
1.84 
(60.3 %) 
1997 
Italy 
2.58 
(24.2 %) 
2.62 
(60.5 %) 
2.55 
(15.3 %) 
2.58 
(7.6 %) 
2.61 
(71.9 %) 
2.55 
(20.5 %) 
4343 
Portugal 
6.34 
(9.6 %) 
6.34 
(55.9 %) 
6.22 
(34.5 %) 
6.53 
(11.0 %) 
6.30 
(57.2 %) 
6.23 
(31.8 %) 
4296 
Spain 
6.78 
(10.7 %) 
6.82 
(32.5 %) 
6.66 
(56.8 %) 
6.90 
(5.0 %) 
6.80 
(36.5 %) 
6.67 
(58.5 %) 
4176 
The wage is measured in local currencies. Averages of logarithmic wages between countries should not be 
compared. The optimal BMI in a clinical sense is defined by a BMI of 23, see text for more details. The 
norm BMI is given by the median BMI value of the social comparison group, see text for more details. 
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Results for our preferred specification, the between-effects model, are presented in 
Table 3. Each line represents a separate estimation of the wage regression as stated in 
Equation (1) for one country. The upper panels present estimates for men and the lower 
panels for women. The included control variables are listed in Table A1 in the appendix 
and are discussed in section 3 as well as the sample restrictions. We will not discuss the 
coefficient estimates for other variables but the indicator variables identifying 
productivity effects associated with deviations from the clinically recommended BMI – 
MedLighter (below BMI of 20) and MedHeavier (above BMI of 26) – and those identifying 
deviations from the norm – NormLighter (below peer group median BMI - 3) and 
NormHeavier (above peer group median BMI + 3) – in detail. Furthermore, because we 
estimate various regressions which implies the testing of various hypotheses we will only 
interpret effects that are significant at the 5-percent level or above to address the 
problem of multiple comparisons. 
Let us now take a look at the estimations in Table 3. Before we turn to the particular 
significant effects in detail, there are three interesting observations. First, significant 
coefficients for deviations from the reference BMI (medical optimal or social norm) 
indicate wage penalties, not wage premiums. Second, wage penalties for deviations from 
the norm occur rather for an upward deviation from the reference BMI than for a 
downward deviation. We only observe one case with significantly lower wages for those 
below the norm in the case of Finish men while we find three significant coefficients 
indicating a penalty for being overweight. Third, wage penalties, again for deviations from 
the norm, seem to be an issue rather for men than for women. Here we find no 
significant effects for women, but four for men who deviate from social norm BMI. This is 
surprising in the light of the existing evidence in the literature on the weight-wage 
relation. In particular, in Austria men incur a wage penalty of seven percent, in Greece 7.6 
percent, and in Spain 6.8 percent for being more than three index points above the norm. 
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Table 3: Estimates of wage effects for deviations of more than three index points from medically recom-
mended and peer group median BMI in Europe 
 
Men 
 
MedLighter 
(0/1) 
MedHeavier 
(0/1) 
NormLighter 
(0/1) 
NormHeavier 
(0/1) 
R
2 
(between) 
Observations 
Austria 
-0.047 
(0.068) 
0.040 
(0.030) 
0.017 
(0.038) 
-0.070* 
(0.031) 
0.343 3823 
Belgium 
-0.055 
(0.059) 
-0.020 
(0.038) 
-0.015 
(0.040) 
-0.026 
(0.038) 
0.418 1532 
Denmark 
-0.002 
(0.074) 
-0.068 
(0.035) 
-0.061 
(0.037) 
0.017 
(0.035) 
0.376 2576 
Finland 
-0.034 
(0.069) 
-0.026 
(0.030) 
-0.075* 
(0.035) 
0.018 
(0.032) 
0.441 3302 
Greece 
-0.301** 
(0.110) 
0.014 
(0.031) 
-0.019 
(0.050) 
-0.076** 
(0.027) 
0.535 3567 
Ireland 
-0.293* 
(0.115) 
0.063 
(0.049) 
0.067 
(0.067) 
-0.051 
(0.041) 
0.488 2511 
Italy 
-0.041 
(0.043) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
-0.026 
(0.029) 
0.002 
(0.023) 
0.459 6583 
Portugal 
-0.011 
(0.067) 
0.020 
(0.025) 
0.011 
(0.035) 
-0.004 
(0.025) 
0.491 6038 
Spain 
-0.062 
(0.066) 
0.052 
(0.027) 
0.067 
(0.036) 
-0.075** 
(0.023) 
0.524 7058 
 
Women 
 
MedLighter 
(0/1) 
MedHeavier 
(0/1) 
NormLighter 
(0/1) 
NormHeavier 
(0/1) 
R
2 
(between) 
Observations 
Austria 
-0.002 
(0.043) 
-0.021 
(0.066) 
0.048 
(0.059) 
0.046 
(0.065) 
0.349 2531 
Belgium 
-0.002 
(0.036) 
0.030 
(0.055) 
-0.055 
(0.050) 
-0.035 
(0.053) 
0.423 1386 
Denmark 
0.011 
(0.080) 
-0.043 
(0.076) 
0.027 
(0.083) 
0.038 
(0.076) 
0.495 2250 
Finland 
-0.064 
(0.044) 
-0.052 
(0.048) 
0.066 
(0.044) 
0.011 
(0.047) 
0.473 2873 
Greece 
0.014 
(0.051) 
-0.047 
(0.075) 
-0.045 
(0.057) 
0.038 
(0.075) 
0.646 2516 
Ireland 
-0.185* 
(0.079) 
-0.124 
(0.104) 
0.140 
(0.079) 
0.109 
(0.104) 
0.659 1997 
Italy 
-0.044* 
(0.021) 
-0.006 
(0.037) 
-0.003 
(0.032) 
-0.029 
(0.035) 
0.517 4343 
Portugal 
-0.059 
(0.042) 
-0.025 
(0.045) 
0.061 
(0.042) 
0.023 
(0.046) 
0.683 4296 
Spain 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
-0.010 
(0.067) 
0.089 
(0.053) 
-0.040 
(0.068) 
0.635 4176 
Estimates of a between-effects model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of hourly wages. The variable MedLighter indicates a BMI < 20 and 
MedHeavier a BMI > 26. The variable NormLighter indicates a BMI which is more than three index 
points below the age and gender specific median BMI within a region and NormHeavier indicates a 
BMI which is more than three index points higher than the respective peer group body mass. Each 
line represents a separate regression. See text for more information on other variables included in 
the regressions. Significance at the 5 % , 1 % and 0.1 % level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respec-
tively. 
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The only wage effects for being more than three index points below the norm is found in 
Finland. The significant wage penalty of 7.3 for downward deviators in Finland is about 
the same size as the penalties for upward deviators in Austria, Greece and Spain. 
We need to view our results for negative productivity effects for deviating from the 
medically recommended BMI with caution, because they are only identified by a small 
fraction of the total sample sizes. For men, 0.9 percent of the sample in Greece and 1.8 
percent of the sample in Ireland identify huge wage penalties of about 30 percent lower 
hourly wages for being underweight. As stated above, we cannot disentangle norm from 
productivity effects at such extreme areas of the weight distribution. Even so, one can 
assume that these effects are potentially driven by seriously underweight individuals 
signaling a long term productivity disadvantage through their body mass. For women, we 
only find two significant effects in Ireland and Italy. Irish women receive an 18.5 percent 
lower hourly wage for being below the clinically recommended body mass in Table 3 
which covers six percent of all women in the sample for Ireland. The wage penalties for 
Italian underweight women is 4.4 percent, which covers about 24 percent of the Italian 
women. 
We run several robustness checks for the estimates of our preferred specification of 
which the most important ones are reported in the appendix. First, we address the 
problem of harmful correlations between the indicator variables for deviations from 
medically recommended and social norm BMI. All correlations between the indicator 
variables are reported in Table A2. As expected, we find significant positive correlations 
between the indicator variables for deviation from medically recommended and social 
norm BMI for all countries as well as for both genders which go in the same direction. 
Significant negative correlations are found between the variables that indicate deviations 
in opposite directions. As a next step to validate our findings from our preferred 
specification, we reestimate the wage regression twice, once only with the variables for 
deviation from peer group median BMI and once only with those for deviation from 
medically recommended BMI.8 The results of these estimations are reported in Table A3 
and Table A4, respectively. Here again, we find that deviations from the reference BMI 
indicate wage penalties, which occur rather for an upward deviation than for a downward 
                                                     
8
 The remaining control variables were the same as reported in the data section. 
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one, and that this is the case rather for men than for women. The effects for upward 
deviations from the norm in Table A3 are more pronounced in significance and effect size 
than the ones for upward deviations from the medically recommended BMI which 
explains why the norm effects dominate in the results for the joint specification reported 
in Table 3. Fixed effects estimates are reported in Table A5 for deviations of more than 
three index points from the peer group mean BMI and the medically optimal BMI. The 
values for the between R-squared as reported in Table 3, A3, and A4 are well above the 
values for the within R-squared in all regressions, as reported in Table A5. According to 
these estimates, only the finding for Austria is robust when applying the fixed effects 
estimator. However, the within estimates are based on little information (four years) and 
the comparison of the R-squared values clearly indicate that most of the variation is 
cross-sectional. We therefore do not discuss the findings for the fixed effects model in 
detail. 
We also run a between-effects estimation where we define deviations from the reference 
BMI value by deviations of more than one standard deviation from the mean body mass 
index of the peer group. The results of these estimations are shown in Table A6. The 
downside of this more adequate specification of deviations from the norm is the fact that 
it does not make sense to let the deviation from the clinically optimal BMI vary with the 
distribution of body mass in the social group. We therefore limit this robustness check to 
deviation from median peer group BMI. The results for being slimmer than the norm are 
similar to the results in Table 3 and A3 for both sexes. Most importantly, we found 
significant wage penalties for men above the social norm for all countries as in Table A3 
except for Austia. For Austria the other country the level of significance of the coefficient 
is little beneath our lowest reported level of significance of five percent. Compared to our 
preferred specification, the wage penalties for heavier men in Greece and Spain are lower 
in these estimates. Although these estimates do not allow for disentangling productivity 
effects from the influence of the social norm, the results which use the standard deviation 
as the definition of the relevant BMI deviation provide corroborative evidence that the 
results displayed in Table 3 are not driven by the concept of a norm deviation favored in 
the preferred specification. 
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Finally, we run between-effects estimations when unhealthy body weight and deviations 
from the norm are defined by deviations of more than 1.5 or five index points from the 
clinically recommended BMI or peer group median BMI, respectively. In Table A7 the 
results of the estimates for a deviation of more than 1.5 index points are reported. For 
men again, we find wage penalties for an upward deviation from the norm BMI in Greece 
and Spain of 10 and 6 percent lower wages, respectively. Additionally, we find a wage 
penalty of about ten percent for Danish men, who are heavier then their peers and wage 
premia of ten and 16 percent for men in Austria and Ireland who are thinner than their 
peers. Men being lighter than medical optimal again incur wage penalties in Greece and 
Ireland of 22 and 27 percent, respectively. Additionally, men in Finland and Italy are 
punished for being lighter than medically optimal with wage cuts of about eleven and six 
percent, respectively while men in Austria enjoy a wage premium of seven percent if they 
are heavier than medically optimal. For women, we find three new effects. In Belgium 
and Italy, women who are lighter than their peers experience wage cuts of ten and four 
percent, respectively, and Greek women yield twelve percent lower hourly wages for 
being lighter than medically recommended. The identification in the estimations of the 
five index points deviation in Table A8 is confined to much less individuals than in the 
case of deviations of tree or 1.5 index points which explains the differences in the results. 
We find a highly significant penalty of about ten percent lower wages for those men well 
above the social norm in Greece and huge wage penalties of about 20 percent and 35 
percent respectively, for those deviating more than five index points in the downward 
direction in Belgium and Greece. The latter effects have not been present when defining 
the relevant deviation by a deviation of tree or more index points. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
In economics, social norms are typically considered as the residual part of observed 
behavior which cannot be explained by economic theory. Empirical studies which quantify 
any effects of social norms are rare. In this paper, we suggest wage sanctions associated 
with deviations from a social norm on body mass as an avenue to quantify the effects of 
social norms. Our empirical strategy allowed to show the existence of an influence of 
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social norms on wages in Europe. For some sections of the weight distribution, we are 
able to disentangle wage effects of deviations from the social norm from a wage 
reduction incurred by the employee for an anticipated lower future productivity. To this 
end, we compare wage effects of deviations from a social norm as measured by the 
median BMI of the relevant peer group with wage effects of deviations from a medical 
optimal BMI. We argue that the future productivity could be foreseen by the health risk 
associated with deviations from an optimal BMI in a clinical sense. We are able to conduct 
these estimates with standardized data for nine European countries along with detailed 
controls for present health limitations among others. Our results suggest that social 
norms set the relevant standard to evaluate men’s physical appearance in Austria, 
Finland, Greece, and Spain. In particular, deviations of more than three index points in 
body mass in the upward direction from the norm is sanctioned with around seven 
percent lower hourly wages in Austria, Greece, and Spain. However, as extensively 
discussed above, given the limitations of the available data and our empirical approach, 
we cannot provide compelling evidence that the correlations reflect causal relationships 
between body mass and wages. A puzzling result compared to the findings in the 
literature is the observation that rather men than women incur wage penalities for being 
overweight. A possible explanation is that our estimation strategy is prone to fail, if the 
social norm body mass is embodied by an ideal body mass rather than a peer group 
median body mass. Further qualitative research needs to explore whether there are 
gender related differences in the relevant peer group body mass. 
The findings in this paper are important in two dimensions. First, from a more general 
point of view, the evidence presented in this paper is surprising and disturbing at the 
same time. Social norms seem to play an important role. For some countries, even 
comparatively moderate deviations from a norm on body mass lead to substantially lower 
hourly wages. To answer the question what particular characteristics are responsible for 
the effects in these countries, one could hypothesize that the cultural or institutional 
context has a moderating effect on the relationship between norm deviation and wages. 
This should raise awareness to many other factors potentially influencing wage setting 
and employment relations which have not been considered so far. However, to 
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investigate these factors would go beyond the scope of this paper and is left for further 
research. 
Second, the paper contributes novel insights to the literature on the weight-wage 
relation. In contrast to the findings in the recent literature, a negative relation between 
body mass and wages is neither confined to severe obese employees nor to women 
alone. There is not one body mass-wage relation for the Western world. Our findings 
provide evidence that the body mass-wage relation is non-linear in many countries. While 
the findings differ substantially between countries, the negative association between 
wages and indicators for a higher or lower body mass index than the reference point (as 
set by the norm or a clinically recommended BMI) is rather confined to men. Given the 
problems related to the identification of causal effects of body mass on wages as pointed 
out above, additional research is required to get even closer to the true effect of body 
mass on wages. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: List of used variables 
 
Name Type Description 
Ln(wage) dependent 
Natural logarithm of hourly wages where wages are deflated by 
consumer price index information. 
MedLighter independent 
Dummy = 1 if individuals BMI is more than tree index points 
below medically recommended BMI. 
MedHeavier independent 
Dummy = 1 if individuals BMI is more than tree index points 
above medically recommended BMI. 
NormLeighter independent 
Dummy = 1 if individuals BMI is more than tree index points 
below social norm BMI, constituted by individuals peer group. 
NormHeavier independent 
Dummy = 1 if individuals BMI is more than tree index points 
above social norm BMI, constituted by individuals peer group. 
Age control Age in years. 
Age² control Spare of age in years. 
Educat control 
Dummies for highest level of education (recognized third level 
education; second stage of secondary level education; less than 
second stage of secondary level education). 
Married control Dummy = 1 if individual is married. 
Children control Dummy only for women to control for past pregnancies. 
Tenure control 
Tenure in month. Variable is top coded at 160 for all individuals 
with tenure equal or above 160 month, due to the available 
data in the ECHP. 
Parttime control Dummy = 1 if individual is working part time. 
Permcontract control Dummy = 1 if individual has permanent contract. 
Absence control 
Number of days of absence due to illness in the last four 
weeks. 
Badhealth control 
Dummy = 1 if individual states to be hampered in daily activi-
ties by physical or mental health problems, illnesses or disabili-
ties. 
NEOccup1-8 control 
Dummies for occupational groups (legislators, senior officials 
and managers; professionals; technicians and associate profes-
sionals; clerks; service workers and shop and market sales 
workers; skilled agricultural and fishery workers; craft and 
related trades workers; plant and machine operators and as-
semblers; elementary occupations). 
Yeardum control 
Dummies to control for the year of the survey (2001, 2000, 
1999, 1998). 
Region control 
Dummies for NUTS 1 regions (number of regions varies de-
pending on examined country).  
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Table A2: Pair wise correlations between indicator variables for deviations of more than three index points 
from medically recommended BMI and social norm BMI 
 
Men 
 MedLighter (0/1) MedHeavier (0/1) 
Austria 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.4559 -0.2602 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.0961 0.7382 
Belgium 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.5510 -0.3209 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.1766 0.8182 
Denmark 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.4359 -0.3208 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.1066 0.7624 
Finland 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.4303 -0.2873 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.0983 0.7120 
Greece 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.3581 -0.3612 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.0919 0.7105 
Ireland 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.4571 -0.4154 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.1552 0.7328 
Italy 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.5477 -0.2052 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.0928 0.7380 
Portugal 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.4357 -0.3021 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.0944 0.7081 
Spain 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.4046 -0.3967 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.1350 0.8025 
 
Women 
 MedLighter (0/1) MedHeavier (0/1) 
Austria 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.6269 -0.1734 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.2993 0.8925 
Belgium 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.5999 -0.1696 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.3130 0.8961 
Denmark 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.9014 -0.2397 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.2654 0.9552 
Finland 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.6738 -0.2338 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.2387 0.8831 
Greece 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.6323 -0.2879 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.3243 0.9444 
Ireland 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.7213 -0.3151 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.3072 0.9652 
Italy 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.4804 -0.1228 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.2854 0.8260 
Portugal 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.5880 -0.2523 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.2269 0.8778 
Spain 
NormLighter (0/1) 0.5847 -0.2606 
NormHeavier (0/1) -0.4110 0.9553 
MedLighter indicates a BMI < 20 and MedHeavier a BMI > 26. NormLighter indicates a BMI more 
than three index points below the age and gender specific median BMI within a region and 
NormHeavier indicates a BMI more than three index points higher than the respective peer 
group body mass. All pair-wise correlations are significant at any levels of significance. 
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Table A3: Wage effects for deviations of more than three index points from peer group median BMI in 
Europe. 
 
Men 
 
NormLighter 
(0/1) 
NormHeavier 
(0/1) 
R
2 
(between) 
Observations 
Austria 
-0.006 
(0.032) 
-0.037* 
(0.019) 
0.342 3823 
Belgium 
-0.032 
(0.032) 
-0.042* 
(0.021) 
0.417 1532 
Denmark 
-0.044 
(0.031) 
-0.039 
(0.021) 
0.373 2576 
Finland 
 -0.077** 
(0.029) 
-0.003 
(0.021) 
0.440 3302 
Greece 
-0.082 
(0.043) 
  -0.068*** 
(0.018) 
0.532 3567 
Ireland 
-0.041 
(0.055) 
-0.009 
(0.026) 
0.484 2511 
Italy 
-0.044 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
0.458 6583 
Portugal 
-0.002 
(0.028) 
0.011 
(0.017) 
0.491 6038 
Spain 
0.033 
(0.030) 
 -0.038** 
(0.013) 
0.523 7058 
 
Women 
 
NormLighter 
(0/1) 
NormHeavier 
(0/1) 
R
2 
(between) 
Observations 
Austria 
0.047 
(0.042) 
0.027 
(0.023) 
0.349 2531 
Belgium 
-0.056 
(0.036) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
0.423 1386 
Denmark 
0.037 
(0.025) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
0.495 2250 
Finland 
0.020 
(0.027) 
-0.033 
(0.019) 
0.471 2873 
Greece 
-0.031 
(0.041) 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
0.646 2516 
Ireland 
-0.004 
(0.048) 
-0.006 
(0.023) 
0.656 1997 
Italy 
-0.042 
(0.027) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
0.516 4343 
Portugal 
0.027 
(0.032) 
0.003 
(0.020) 
0.683 4296 
Spain 
0.059 
(0.041) 
 -0.045** 
(0.016) 
0.635 4176 
Estimates of a between-effects model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wages. NormLighter indicates a BMI more 
than three index points below the age and gender specific median BMI within a region 
and NormHeavier indicates a BMI is more than three index points higher than the respec-
tive median of the peer group body mass. Each line represents a separate regression. See 
text for information on included control variables. Significance at the 5 %, 1 % and 0.1 % 
level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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Table A4: Wage effects for deviations of more than three index points from medically recommended BMI in 
Europe. 
 
Men 
 MedLighter (0/1) 
MedHeavier 
(0/1) 
R
2 
(between) Observations 
Austria 
-0.028 
(0.058) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
0.341 3823 
Belgium 
-0.067 
(0.049) 
-0.039* 
(0.020) 
0.417 1532 
Denmark 
-0.062 
(0.064) 
-0.043* 
(0.019) 
0.374 2576 
Finland 
-0.103 
(0.060) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
0.439 3302 
Greece 
 -0.319** 
(0.099) 
-0.048* 
(0.019) 
0.532 3567 
Ireland 
-0.241* 
(0.101) 
0.005 
(0.028) 
0.487 2511 
Italy 
-0.064 
(0.034) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.459 6583 
Portugal 
-0.001 
(0.057) 
0.015 
(0.015) 
0.491 6038 
Spain 
-0.009 
(0.059) 
-0.029* 
(0.014) 
0.522 7058 
 
Women 
 MedLighter (0/1) 
MedHeavier 
(0/1) 
R
2 
(between) Observations 
Austria 
0.019 
(0.030) 
0.022 
(0.025) 
0.348 2531 
Belgium 
-0.026 
(0.026) 
-0.003 
(0.022) 
0.422 1386 
Denmark 
0.034 
(0.024) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
0.495 2250 
Finland 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
-0.046* 
(0.019) 
0.471 2873 
Greece 
-0.014 
(0.037) 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
0.645 2516 
Ireland 
-0.076 
(0.047) 
-0.024 
(0.022) 
0.658 1997 
Italy 
-0.042* 
(0.017) 
-0.033 
(0.019) 
0.517 4343 
Portugal 
-0.022 
(0.032) 
-0.010 
(0.019) 
0.683 4296 
Spain 
0.008 
(0.029) 
-0.049** 
(0.017) 
0.635 4176 
Estimates of between-effects models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The de-
pendent variable is the logarithm of hourly wages. MedLighter indicates a BMI < 20 and 
MedHeavier a BMI > 26. Each line represents a separate regression. See text for information 
on included control variables. Significance at the 5 %, 1 % and 0.1 % level is denoted by *, ** 
and ***, respectively. 
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Table A5: Fixed effects estimates of wage effects for deviations of more than three index points from med-
ically recommended and peer group median BMI in Europe 
 
Men 
 MedLighter  MedHeavier  NormLighter  NormHeavier  
R
2 
(within) 
Observations 
Austria 
0.017 
(0.040) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.012 
(0.021) 
-0.039* 
(0.018) 
0.094 3823 
Belgium 
-0.152* 
(0.070) 
0.054 
(0.036) 
-0.047 
(0.046) 
-0.114*** 
(0.040) 
0.132 1532 
Denmark 
0.046 
(0.052) 
0.016 
(0.022) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
0.012 
(0.025) 
0.092 2576 
Finland 
-0.018 
(0.049) 
0.025 
(0.023) 
-0.008 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.026) 
0.086 3302 
Greece 
-0.114 
(0.070) 
0.007 
(0.022) 
0.032 
(0.027) 
-0.035 
(0.024) 
0.065 3567 
Ireland 
0.049 
(0.071) 
-0.000 
(0.031) 
0.015 
(0.048) 
0.080* 
(0.038) 
0.182 2511 
Italy 
0.038 
(0.026) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.024 
(0.015) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
0.041 6583 
Portugal 
-0.040 
(0.034) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
0.176 6038 
Spain 
-0.005 
(0.051) 
0.012 
(0.017) 
0.025 
(0.023) 
-0.029 
(0.018) 
0.111 7058 
 
Women 
 MedLighter  MedHeavier  NormLighter  NormHeavier  
R
2 
(within) 
Observations 
Austria 
-0.048* 
(0.022) 
0.028 
(0.034) 
-0.021 
(0.026) 
-0.007 
(0.029) 
0.120 2531 
Belgium 
0.035 
(0.044) 
0.025 
(0.062) 
-0.011 
(0.049) 
-0.142* 
(0.056) 
0.144 1386 
Denmark 
-0.056 
(0.032) 
-0.004 
(0.028) 
0.059 
(0.032) 
-0.009 
(0.027) 
0.067 2250 
Finland 
-0.000 
(0.024) 
0.018 
(0.027) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
-0.041 
(0.028) 
0.056 2873 
Greece 
0.016 
(0.034) 
-0.007 
(0.044) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
0.030 
(0.042) 
0.074 2516 
Ireland 
-0.063 
(0.045) 
0.052 
(0.051) 
0.045 
(0.042) 
-0.039 
(0.052) 
0.312 1997 
Italy 
0.020 
(0.013) 
0.036 
(0.022) 
-0.024 
(0.018) 
-0.012 
(0.017) 
0.064 4343 
Portugal 
-0.025 
(0.021) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
0.029 
(0.017) 
0.009 
(0.021) 
0.126 4296 
Spain 
-0.008 
(0.026) 
-0.067 
(0.035) 
-0.014 
(0.029) 
0.075* 
(0.033) 
0.140 4176 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly 
wages. MedLighter indicates a BMI < 20 and MedHeavier a BMI > 26. NormLighter indicates a 
BMI more than three index points below the age and gender specific median BMI within a 
region and NormHeavier indicates a BMI more than three index points higher than the re-
spective peer group body mass. Each line represents a separate regression. See text for in-
formation on included control variables. Significance at the 5 %, 1 % and 0.1 % level is de-
noted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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Table A6: Wage effects for deviations of more than one standard deviation from peer group mean BMI 
 
Men 
 NormLighter 
NormHeavier 
) 
R
2 
(between) Observations 
Austria 
-0.010 
(0.029) 
-0.036 
(0.019) 
0.342 3823 
Belgium 
-0.034 
(0.033) 
-0.048* 
(0.021) 
0.415 1530 
Denmark 
-0.044 
(0.031) 
-0.041* 
(0.021) 
0.372 2585 
Finland 
-0.056* 
(0.028) 
-0.010 
(0.023) 
0.439 3302 
Greece 
-0.080* 
(0.038) 
  -0.072*** 
(0.018) 
0.532 3567 
Ireland 
-0.061 
(0.053) 
-0.012 
(0.026) 
0.484 2511 
Italy 
-0.046* 
(0.019) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
0.459 6583 
Portugal 
-0.026 
(0.026) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
0.492 6038 
Spain 
-0.006 
(0.030) 
  -0.042*** 
(0.013) 
0.523 7058 
 
Women 
 NormLighter  NormHeavier R
2 
(between) Observations 
Austria 
-0.028 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
0.250 2531 
Belgium 
-0.035 
(0.035) 
-0.010 
(0.023) 
0.422 1386 
Denmark 
0.026 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.017) 
0.494 2250 
Finland 
0.009 
(0.027) 
-0.029 
(0.022) 
0.470 2873 
Greece 
-0.033 
(0.042) 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
0.646 2516 
Ireland 
0.001 
(0.047) 
0.003 
(0.022) 
0.656 1997 
Italy 
-0.040 
(0.024) 
-0.022 
(0.018) 
0.516 4343 
Portugal 
0.033 
(0.032) 
0.006 
(0.020) 
0.683 4296 
Spain 
0.056 
(0.036) 
-0.041* 
(0.016) 
0.635 4176 
Estimates of a between-effects model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wages. NormLighter indi-
cates a BMI more than one standard deviation below the age and gender spe-
cific mean BMI within a region and NormHeavier indicates a BMI more than 
one standard deviation higher than the respective mean of the peer group 
body mass. Each line represents a separate regression See text for information 
on included control variables. Significance at the 5 %, 1 % and 0.1 % level is 
denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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Table A7: Estimates of wage effects for deviations of more than 1.5 index points from medically recom-
mended and peer group median BMI in Europe 
 
Men 
 MedLighter  MedHeavier  NormLighter  NormHeavier  
R
2 
(between) 
Observations 
Austria 
-0.062 
(0.039) 
0.073* 
(0.034) 
0.099** 
(0.037) 
-0.034 
(0.026) 
0.344 3,823 
Belgium 
-0.046 
(0.040) 
-0.025 
(0.039) 
-0.027 
(0.040) 
-0.034 
(0.032) 
0.418 1,532 
Denmark 
-0.006 
(0.042) 
0.040 
(0.039) 
-0.031 
(0.042) 
-0.092** 
(0.030) 
0.378 2,576 
Finland 
-0.115** 
(0.039) 
0.011 
(0.036) 
0.013 
(0.038) 
-0.036 
(0.027) 
0.443 3,302 
Greece 
-0.222*** 
(0.059) 
0.081 
(0.046) 
0.059 
(0.051) 
-0.096*** 
(0.024) 
0.537 3,567 
Ireland 
-0.270*** 
(0.074) 
0.071 
(0.059) 
0.164* 
(0.064) 
-0.015 
(0.037) 
0.491 2,511 
Italy 
-0.068** 
(0.025) 
0.017 
(0.021) 
0.019 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
0.460 6,583 
Portugal 
-0.002 
(0.037) 
0.051 
(0.032) 
0.026 
(0.035) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
0.492 6,038 
Spain 
-0.058 
(0.041) 
0.026 
(0.034) 
0.027 
(0.037) 
-0.062** 
(0.021) 
0.524 7,058 
 
Women 
 MedLighter  MedHeavier  NormLighter  NormHeavier  
R
2 
(between) 
Observations 
Austria 
-0.020 
(0.044) 
-0.017 
(0.053) 
0.050 
(0.041) 
0.042 
(0.059) 
0.349 2,531 
Belgium 
0.059 
(0.035) 
0.009 
(0.043) 
-0.101** 
(0.036) 
-0.012 
(0.045) 
0.427 1,386 
Denmark 
0.018 
(0.055) 
0.018 
(0.060) 
0.021 
(0.055) 
-0.022 
(0.062) 
0.497 2,250 
Finland 
0.012 
(0.038) 
-0.068 
(0.044) 
0.012 
(0.037) 
0.037 
(0.044) 
0.473 2,873 
Greece 
-0.120** 
(0.044) 
-0.063 
(0.052) 
0.061 
(0.044) 
0.029 
(0.054) 
0.649 2,516 
Ireland 
-0.058 
(0.065) 
-0.003 
(0.070) 
0.070 
(0.063) 
-0.019 
(0.069) 
0.658 1,997 
Italy 
-0.006 
(0.025) 
-0.046 
(0.028) 
-0.046* 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.031) 
0.518 4,343 
Portugal 
0.030 
(0.034) 
-0.050 
(0.041) 
-0.011 
(0.036) 
0.055 
(0.039) 
0.683 4,296 
Spain 
-0.000 
(0.039) 
-0.021 
(0.045) 
0.019 
(0.038) 
-0.025 
(0.051) 
0.635 4,176 
Estimates of a between-effects model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of hourly wages. MedLighter indicates a BMI < 21.5 and MedHeavier a 
BMI > 24.5. NormLighter indicates a BMI more than 1.5 index points below the age and gender 
specific median BMI within a region and NormHeavier indicates a BMI more than 1.5 index points 
higher than the respective peer group body mass. Each line represents a separate regression. See 
text for information on included control variables. Significance at the 5 %, 1 % and 0.1 % level is 
denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
  
 
36 
Table A8: Estimates of wage effects for deviations of more than five index points from medically recom-
mended and peer group median BMI in Europe 
 
Men 
 MedLighter  MedHeavier  NormLighter  NormHeavier 
R
2 
(between) 
Observations 
Austria 
-0.170 
(0.146) 
-0.062 
(0.041) 
0.139 
(0.085) 
0.022 
(0.044) 
0.345 3,823 
Belgium 
0.259 
(0.170) 
-0.074 
(0.050) 
-0.209* 
(0.085) 
0.036 
(0.051) 
0.420 1,532 
Denmark 
0.082 
(0.267) 
0.032 
(0.048) 
-0.128 
(0.091) 
-0.069 
(0.050) 
0.374 2,576 
Finland 
-0.365 
(0.228) 
0.049 
(0.035) 
-0.119 
(0.082) 
-0.064 
(0.042) 
0.442 3,302 
Greece 
0.055 
(0.432) 
0.039 
(0.039) 
-0.351** 
(0.120) 
-0.107** 
(0.038) 
0.536 3,567 
Ireland 
0.204 
(0.382) 
0.012 
(0.061) 
-0.186 
(0.107) 
-0.014 
(0.059) 
0.485 2,511 
Italy 
0.050 
(0.121) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
-0.040 
(0.064) 
0.014 
(0.032) 
0.458 6,583 
Portugal 
-0.003 
(0.221) 
0.039 
(0.034) 
0.012 
(0.074) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
0.492 6,038 
Spain 
0.265 
(0.195) 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.057 
(0.069) 
-0.014 
(0.031) 
0.524 7,058 
 
Women 
 MedLighter  MedHeavier  NormLighter  NormHeavier  
R
2 
(between) 
Observations 
Austria 
-0.013 
(0.100) 
-0.075 
(0.099) 
0.109 
(0.133) 
0.101 
(0.096) 
0.350 2,531 
Belgium 
-0.041 
(0.073) 
-0.063 
(0.065) 
0.170 
(0.141) 
0.053 
(0.064) 
0.423 1,386 
Denmark 
0.130 
(0.150) 
0.175 
(0.104) 
-0.276 
(0.172) 
-0.174 
(0.104) 
0.497 2,250 
Finland 
-0.108 
(0.091) 
-0.089 
(0.064) 
0.046 
(0.082) 
0.047 
(0.065) 
0.472 2,873 
Greece 
-0.022 
(0.091) 
0.033 
(0.086) 
-0.059 
(0.117) 
-0.035 
(0.087) 
0.646 2,516 
Ireland 
0.067 
(0.225) 
-0.020 
(0.096) 
-0.089 
(0.205) 
0.022 
(0.097) 
0.657 1,997 
Italy 
-0.028 
(0.039) 
-0.037 
(0.050) 
0.006 
(0.103) 
0.015 
(0.045) 
0.515 4,343 
Portugal 
-0.000 
(0.098) 
0.075 
(0.066) 
0.086 
(0.079) 
-0.083 
(0.067) 
0.683 4,296 
Spain 
-0.089 
(0.083) 
0.016 
(0.105) 
0.287 
(0.154) 
-0.065 
(0.106) 
0.635 4,176 
Estimates of a between-effects model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of hourly wages. MedLighter indicates a BMI < 18 and MedHeavier a BMI > 28. 
NormLighter indicates a BMI more than five index points below the age and gender specific median 
BMI within a region and NormHeavier indicates a BMI more than five index points higher than the 
respective peer group body mass. Each line represents a separate regression. See text for information 
on included control variables. Significance at the 5 %, 1 % and 0.1 % level is denoted by *, ** and ***, 
respectively. 
 
